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Maneer de Rector, esteemed colleagues and friends,  
It is a familiar photograph: triumphant lawyers and clients on the steps of the court after 
judgment is rendered - the proverbial (and sometimes lit ral) champagne moment celebrating 
litigation success.  In my lecture this afternoon, I am going to invite you to reflect critically on 
this champagne moment, and to adjust the lens throug  which we view “success” in human 
rights litigation. 
The Champagne photo - a static snapshot of judgement day - could be taken with an old 
camera obscura, with its tiny hole that projects a single image into darkened room. Like the 
camera obscura, we often consider litigation through a narrow frame. As lawyers, trained to 
analyse, persuade and maneouvre our clients towards the light, we tend to focus on Judgment 
day, when the Almighty reflects on our carefully crafted arguments, and awards the legally 
righteous (or right). Within this narrow frame, the judgment may be seen as the culimination 
of the litigation journey, when fates will be sealed and justice done. 
We know of course that the reality is quite different. A winning judgement that remains (as 
many do) unimplemented, may change little. A judgment, win or lose, that creates legal or 
political backlash may aggravate the situation on the ground. Conversely, a losing case that 
exposes injustice and catalyses further action, for example, may ultimately be transformative.  
It follows that we need to rethink success in HR litigation - as Jules Lobel noted, to see the 
“success without victory,” and conversely recognize that failure may follow fast on victory’s 
heels.  
Strategic human rights litigation, in some systems called public interest litigation, test 
litigation, simply impact litigation, is a growing area of practice globally. It involves the 
increased use of the courts (national and supranational) by lawyers and civil society groups 
around the world, to advance human rights goals that go beyond the interests of just the 
applicants in the case.  It reflects also the need to be strategic in the way litigation is done, to 
ensure that the process, both inside and outside of the courtroom, contribu es to real success, 
beyond legal victory.   
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As strategic human rights litigation has grown in recent years, so has controversy as to the 
role that courts can or should play in human rights change. To some extent this reflects long 
established academic debate in some parts of the world, notably around civil rights litigation 
in the United States. At one end of the spectrum, so e appear to assume the inherent value of 
the judicial process and its outcome. Lawyers and litigators may be particularly prone to this, 
perhaps unconsciously to justify our own role in the exotic rituals of the dark sanctum of 
court, with our flowing robes and in some systems funny wigs (… though this it may not be 
the best moment for me to mock unusual costumes). But if there are some for whom litigation 
takes on almost religious connotations, there are oth rs that almost demonise the role of the 
courts, as ‘anti-democratic’ for example, wresting power from elected processes, or as 
inherently elitist and ineffective, disconnected from social struggles within which real change 
happens.  
My question is where, within these extremes of heaven and hell, the value of HRL lies.  
As a human rights litigator for many years, I am not a neutral observer, but rather a  skeptical 
believer in the potential of human rights litigation; if done strategically and used properly it 
can change the human rights landscape in many ways. But that transformation is not 
automatic. Impact may be positive or negative. The value of litigation cannot be assumed, and 
it cannot be appreciated if we peer through a narrow lens to a snapshot ‘outcome’ of a case.  
My suggestion today then is that we need to update the camera. To view the significance of 
human rights litigation, we need to look through three, more modern, sophisticated lenses. 
- The first lens is a high definition one, sensitive enough to pick out detail; with this 
lens we will see the multi-dimensional impact of human rights litigation;  
- The second lens is a long one,  required to view impact over time;  with this lens we 
look beyond the judgment, to see how litigation may also influence change before 
cases are even presented, throughout the process, and a very long time after judgment; 
- The third lens is wide-angled, enabling us to see litigation in context; with this lens we 
see the synergy between litigation and other agents for change, such as civil society 
advocacy, education or legislative reform.  
What we can explore with these lenses may not be so much whether litigation provided a 
solution (which will only rarely be case for some of the broad-reaching social or political 
problems that underpin rights violations), but whether and how litigation contributed, directly 
and indirectly, to positive change.  
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2. Panoramic Shot of Human rights litigation 
Before exploring impact, let’s pause for a moment and take a panoramic view of HR litigation 
in the world today, and see the rapidly evolving landscape that lies before us.  
Judge Christopher Greenwood, opening the academic year at the Grotius centre in the Hague 
a couple years ago, spoke of this as an ‘Age of international adjudication’.  In no area is this 
more fitting than in relation to the practice of human rights litigation, which has burgeoned in 
recent decades. There has been a proliferation of regional and international courts and bodies 
to hear human rights claims, human rights litigation intersects with a growing range of areas 
of international law and practice, and the volume of human rights claims has grown 
exponentially.  
Yet not so long ago the idea that HR law could be given teeth by allowing individuals to bring 
claims against the state was considered revolutionary. Anthony Lester in his recent book Five 
Ideas to Fight For (2016) notes that when the European Court of Human Rights was proposed 
in 1950, the UK AG, Sr Hartley Shawcross, wrote that “the possibility of UK citizens lodging 
complaints against their government in Strasbourg is wholly opposed to the theory of 
responsible government.’ A Foreign Office Ministerial Brief went further: “to allow 
governments to become the object of such potentially v gue charges by individuals, is to 
invite Communists, crooks and cranks of every description to bring actions.” Thankfully, that 
advice was rejected and the UK joined the Court when it was created in 1959 (a situation that 
will hopefully continue!). And human rights litigators (us commies, crooks, cranks & others) 
have been bringing cases with increased regularity ever since.  
The expansion of HR litigation is seen on the national level too. Colombian Cesar Rodriquez 
Garavito in his excellent work on “Courts and Social Change” identifies an ‘international 
tendency towards constitutional protagonism in respect of rights.” Well known examples of 
this “progressive neo-constitutionalism” include the work of the Indian supreme court, South 
African constitutional court, but also courts across Latin America, that are increasingly 
engaged in long term, multi-staged litigation processes to oversee the remediation of deep-
rooted, “structural” HR problems. 
We also see an ever-broader array of types of litigation for HR purposes, brought nationally 
and trans-nationally, and against a expanding range of defendants. Recent cases brought by 
Dutch lawyers against FIFA, to secure human rights standards in preparations for the World 
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Cup, is just one example of this increasingly colourful display of creative litigation against 
states and diverse non-state actors.  
Within our panorama we also see increased movement and engagement by a range of actors: 
growing numbers of NGOs specifically dedicated to SHRL;  growing practice of resort to 
amicus or third party interventions, on the international and national levels, drawing a broader 
range of voices into the litigation conversation; i turn, what has been called the “growing 
trans-judicial dialogue,” of judges referring increasingly to one another’s jurisprudence, 
horizontally between national judiciaries, vertically between national and international courts, 
and between supra-national systems. This enhances the ignificance of litigation for other 
courts and systems, and develops the tapestry of international human rights law and practice.  
But as we peruse this rich and fertile landscape, w should also be aware of potential 
blindspots, and acknowledge the serious contemporary challenges facing human rights 
litigation. 
Despite the plethora of fora, the majority of the worlds citizens still have no access to an 
international human rights remedy at all. Existing human rights courts and bodies are blighted 
by challenges, including overload, delays, crippling resource constraints, and variable - but 
notoriously poor - records of implementation. Increasing political push-back against human 
rights courts is a testament perhaps to their impact. This has troubling reflections here in 
Europe in the novel open refusal to implement judgments of the ECtHR, or threats to leave 
the system, or in Africa in the suspension of the Southern African Development Community’s 
Tribunal at the behest of the Zimbabwean government, following a high profile ruling against 
it.  
On the national level, the role of the judiciary is rendered more challenging, but also more 
important, in light of political developments in some states – reflected perhaps in Pres. 
Trump’s infamous attack on the “so-called judge” blocking his immigration ban. The scourge 
of growing attacks on human rights defenders and lawyers around the world is another dark 
part of the litigation landscape, with obvious consequences for the ability of victims to 
challenge violations. Myriad other impediments, from costs and delays, harassment and 
reprisals, to the more subtle impact of the power dynamics, underpinning HR violations and 
the justice system itself, often block access to justice on the national level. Lord Bingham in 
his recent book “The Rule of law” refers to writings 350 years ago complaining that, in 
matters of justice “the remedy is worse than the disease. You must spend 10 pounds to recover 
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5!”  The reality today is that equality before courts remains elusive, in line with the old ironic 
refrain that “Justice is open to all, like the Ritz hotel.”  
Reflecting on our panoramic view, then, we see an expanding and increasingly rich body of 
litigation, with more fora, litigation tools, engaged actors and opportunities. At the same time, 
access to human rights litigation is irregular, and even when it is possible, it can be a slow, 
expensive and risky business.  
The developing practice of rights litigation, and its risks, underlines the importance of careful 
enquiry into litigation’s potential and limitations. I would therefore like us to now leave the 
panoramic view, and zoom in with our advanced new lenses.  
Using our first two lenses - one focused on high definition, the other on the long range view - 
I would like to identify and illustrate some of the dimensions on which strategic human rights 
litigation may have an impact, over time. Although there are many, I will focus on four levels 
of impact: 1st the impact on victims and survivors, 2nd on the law, 3rd on political and social 
change, and 4th on democracy and the rule of law.  
3: Dimensions of Impact 
3.1: Victims and Survivors 
The starting point for any analysis of the effects of human rights litigation, ‘strategic’ or not, 
should be the impact on those most affected – victims and survivors. While systems vary 
greatly, human rights litigation may secure many different forms of reparation for applicants 
and often also for a broader range of affected persons than just the petitioners in the case.  
The value of reparation orders from courts - compensation, restitution, concrete measures of 
satisfaction etc. - when they are implemented, is perhaps clear. Somewhat more neglected 
though, is the restorative function of the HR litigation process. The declarato y impact of the 
judgment itself has a role to play here – validating experience, authoritatively recognizing 
wrongs and allocating responsibility. But the power of the process also deserves emphasis.  
Allow me to share an example from my work in Guatemala that may be illustrative. During 
1990s, I represented the indigenous community of Plan de Sanchez, survivors of a massacre 
that killed 268 on one day in July 1982 as part of the Guatemalan genocide. The case went to 
the Inter-American commission on human rights, and from there to the Inter-American Court, 
resulting in the Plan de Sanchez v Guatemala judgment of 2004.   
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The significance of the case might be seen on multiple levels and at various points of time. Its 
impact might be considered now, so far as the litigation has been referred to as the 
“foundational phase” of on-going criminal accountability processes on genocide in 
Guatemala. Moving a decade back, to 2004, others  focus on the Court comprehensive 
reparations order. I recall before we presented the cas  when I asked the community about its 
goals for the case, they said (among other things) schools, hospitals and crops.  I said I was 
sorry but I did not think that a very likely result of human rights litigation. I am pleased to 
have been wrong. The wide-reaching reparations order included socio-economic measures – 
the provision of roads, sewage systems, teachers, a medical centre and psycho social support - 
as well as measures to promote the Mayan culture and to honour the memory of the dead for 
example. Notably these were ordered not only for the applicants in the case, from Plan de 
Sanchez, but other affected communities. Even before the judgment was rendered, the long 
process of reparation began when Guatemala erected a chapel, acknowledged wrongs and 
apologized.  
To appreciate the significance of the case though, I would cast our eye further, and jump 
another decade back in time, to the very earliest days of the preparation of case: when 
conversations with and between communities began; when they began to share and to 
confront experiences for the first time; when they b gan to organize themselves for purposes 
of litigation; when we in turn drew together, with journalists and academics, research on the 
massacres and their systematicity as part of a genocidal plan. Discussing this with the 
community, we realized the insidious notions some of them harboured as to what, or who 
among them, might have brought this misfortune on their community. These processes were 
one way, as Argentine legal philosopher Jaime Malamud Goti notes, that victims came to 
internalise that they were not in any way ‘responsible for their own misfortune.’ As such the 
preparatory process of litigation, and its contribution to personal and collective restorative and 
transitional processes, should not be overlooked.  
3.2 Legal change 
The second site of impact I would like to hone in on this afternoon is the impact of human 
rights litigation on the law itself. Legal change may arise from litigation in many ways.  
Legislative change is obviously one. Depending on the system, law reform may flow, directly 
or indirectly, from judgments, though the change may be for the better or worse. A classic 
example was the Broeks v Netherlands case where the tax and social security system of this 
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country was fundamentally changed following a decision that provisions assuming 
“breadwinners” to be male heads of household was discriminatory.  
Important in this context is legal change through jurisprudence, in other words how the law 
also develops through the litigation itself. Over the past fifty years, a detailed body of 
international human rights law has been grafted onto the skeletal framework of human rights 
treaties through litigation. Unsurprisingly, a key goal of much strategic human rights litigation 
in recent decades, by those who have  been referred to as “norm entrepreneurs,” has been to 
shape international standards, and to open up domestic systems to these international 
standards, thereby providing normative tools for future cases.  
New rights, such as right to truth, have emerged through jurisprudence, and travelled across 
systems. New remedies and procedures have emerged from the litigation process too. It was 
only for example through  lawyers asking for things they perhaps thought they wouldn’t get 
that the Inter-American system developed its holistic approach to reparation, or that amicus 
practice became embedded across systems.  
This strategic litigation opportunism has shaped remedies and procedures nationally too. A 
creative example were the “collective habeas corpus” claims lodged for all persons detain d n 
inhumane conditions in Argentina, which although entir ly unprecedented, were accepted by 
the Courts - “trail-blazing” litigation that created new collective remedies for the future.  
3.3 Political, social and practical change.  
Our third dimension of impact is the broad category of political or social change. Perhaps the 
most obvious way in which human rights litigation pursues change is by challenging practices 
that violate human rights, and states policies that often underpin them.   
States may directly cease violations and change policy as a result of cases that expose 
unlawfulness. An example would be the security detention of non-nationals in the UK post 
9/11, which already ceased in the course of the A&Ors v UK litigation. Of course new 
policies and measures emerged - in that case, control orders – new rounds of litigation, and 
new policy adjustments … and so the trialogue betwen the executive, judiciary and 
legislature goes on. 
Often, the relationship between litigation and policy change is less direct. Litigation may 
simply serve to draw out and clarify state policy, as the state elaborates (and sometimes 
modifies) its position for litigation. It may serve to put, or to keep, an unfavourable issue on 
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the political agenda, or to create political space for dialogue towards broader solutions. In 
Latin America in the past decade, a series of “meta-cases” have involved the courts in 
supervising the elaboration and implementation of plicy over time, while  securing  the 
active participation of affected persons whose voices are rarely heard in political debate. 
Perhaps most important, is the elusive question of behavioural change, and the impact on the 
attitudes and ‘collective social constructs’ that contribute to violations. In this context we 
should consider the role of litigation in exposing, reframing and catalysing.  
The power of the litigation process to expose information arises directly, in for example, the 
‘Freedom of Information Act’ type of litigation that has grown around the world, but it also 
surfaces indirectly as the truth is prised open through evidence gathering and litigation 
exchange. The lack of justice may be exposed, through litigation’s failure. Preparing for 
litigation may lead to documenting violations, and contribute in turn to historical larification.  
Last year I asked a Palestinian applicant, whose home is sandwiched between two expanding 
settlements, why he continued with legal action, despit  negligible prospects of success before 
Israeli courts, and serious threats. He answered: “There is an Arab proverb that ‘Even the 
bullet that misses makes a noise.’ If they do nothig I have a record.”  
 Turning to its reframing function, litigation may influence perceptions conerning 
affected individuals and groups, by telling the human story. The litigation narrative has a 
humanising power, highlighting for example - in the case of torture and rendition victims such 
as our client Abu Zubaydah -  what euphemisms such as “enhanced interrogation techniques” 
mean for real human beings. Litigation may also help to reframe the way issues are discussed, 
with the judicial process naturally helping to recast violations as not only political issues but 
as legal issues and questions of fundamental human rights.  
In 1965 Rev Martin Luther King Jr noted that “It seems to be a fact of life that human 
beings cannot continue to do wrong without eventually reaching out for some thin 
rationalization, to clothe an obvious wrong in the b autiful garments of righteousness.” The 
courts, as King observed, had on occasion provided those garments to legitimize rights 
violations, through cases such as Plessy v. Ferguson, which established the doctrine of 
“separate but equal” to justify segregation, or the notorious Dred Scott case affirming the 
constitutional right to own slaves. But King also believed that litigation could unravel these 
rationalisations, as it has done but in 1954 with the seminal Brown v Board of Education 
case, which exposed the disengenuity of ‘seperate but qual.’ In this way litigation can help to 
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awaken or shape public consciousness, to expose the frailty of justifications for abuse, or (as 
one Turkish activist I interviewed said of torture litigation) at least to “denormalise” 
violations (even if it didn’t stop them).  
Critics have at times described litigation as disempowering lawyer-led processes, 
disconnected and a distraction from more effective struggles. This is often true. But much as 
ever depends - on how litigation done, by whom it is driven and its relationship with social 
movements. Litigation can and has also given visibility, credibility and a public voice to 
human rights advocates, and facilitated organisation and mobilisation.  
The case of Hadijatou Mani v Niger may illustrate some of these issues. 
Hadijatou’s story is both extraordinary and typical. Like tens of thousands of others in Niger, 
she was born into slavery, sold by her mother’s master at 12, and subjected to a daily diet of 
rape and domestic abuse. One day her master provided her a signed “liberation certificate” in 
order to make her one of his four wives. She refused, and left, spurring lines of litigation. Her 
former master had Hadijatou prosecuted for bigamy (as she had taken a husband of her 
choice), while she asserted her right to be free in accordance with prohibition on slavery in 
Nigerienne law. Unsuccessful before domestic courts, we took her case to the court of the 
Economic Community of West Africa (the ECOWAS court). To its credit, the ECOWAS 
court agreed to hold a public hearing in Niamey, Niger, with the victim, dignatories, much 
fanfare and, importantly, great press interest.  
Judgment was rendered some months later, in Hadijatou’s favour, finding the state 
responsible for slavery, which was described as historic. The judgment, and compensation 
paid, are undoubtedly significant.  But the impact of the case was felt long before - Mani 
herself was released from prison when the case was lodged. And in large part the enduring 
impact of the case may lie in the empowerment dimension that I just mentioned.  
When I first went to meet Hadijatou, to prepare the case, I was warned she would not look me 
in the eye, as this was forbidden for slaves. This proved true. Yet she decided to testify before 
a packed courtroom in Niamey. She did so faltering at first, but as her story was heard,  you 
could see her physically grow in stature and confidence. Beyond the palpable empowerment 
of Hadijatou that this process represented, her case prompted other victims to come forward to 
claim their freedom or seek support, even before judgment. The NGO Timidria that made the 
case possible, founded in part by former slaves, decribes being taken more seriously by 
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government and the judiciary since the case.  Crucially, on the night of the hearing, the taboo 
problem of slavery was debated on public radio for the first time.  
There is a long way to go to eradicate slavery in Niger and her case was no panacea. But the 
what Stanley Cohen calls the “state of denial” has been shattered, slavery is acknowledged 
and now the subject of state policies, and activists - on whom the ultimate success of this 
work will largely depend - are mobilized and empowered for the struggle ahead.    
3.4. Democracy and The Rule and Law  
The fourth dimension of impact of litigation which I will deal with briefly, though it is 
fundamental – is the role of litigation in preservation and promotion of the rule of law. The 
courts provide vehicles through which the law, including international human rights law, can 
be interpreted, applied and given real effect. “A right without a remedy is no right at all,” and 
it is through litigation those whose rights are denied can seek to enforce them, and the 
government held to account under the law.   
The vast and variable body of litigation relating to the so-called ‘war on terror’ gives us much 
to reflect on in this respect. Courts have often been acutely deferential in face of national 
security concerns. Extreme examples, such as refusal by courts of the United States to even 
hear torture suits on “state secrecy” grounds, clearly undermine the rule of law. But in myriad 
other cases around the globe, courts have at least called the state to account as regards the 
necessity and proportionality of measures taken in name of counter-terrorism, however 
imperfectly. This litigation has often contributed to valuable debate – inside the courtroom 
and beyond - on the proper function of courts, and the separation of powers, in a democracy.  
This is exemplified by Lord Bingham rebuke to the UK govt in A &Ors (arbitrary detention) 
case, that: 
“I do not accept the distinction which … the Attorney General drew between 
democratic institutions and the courts .... The function of independent judges ... [is] a 
cardinal feature of the modern democratic state, a cornerstone of the rule of law itself. 
The Attorney General is fully entitled to insist onthe proper limits of judicial 
authority, but he is wrong to stigmatize judicial decision-making as in some way 
undemocratic.” 
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Experience since 9/11 ought to teach us that it is in times of greatest strain, when the 
executive is drawn to exceed the boundaries of the law, and the legislature to exceed the 
boundaries of international law, that meaningful judicial oversight is most important.   
I will therefore take as the last example of the aft rnoon the series of habeas corpus cases in 
US courts brought on behalf the detainees at Guantan mo Bay.   
The Guantanamo litigation was a multi-staged journey that culminated in a quintessential 
champagne moment. In 2008, in the Boumidiene case, the US Supreme Court found that all 
Guantanamo detainees had the constitutional right to challenge the lawfulness of their 
detention. It was hailed as a historic victory for the rule of law.  
Jubilation was somewhat tempered by the fact it had taken 6 years to reach a decision on a 
remedy that is intended to provide relief within hours, days or maybe in the most exceptional 
circumstances weeks. This reflected judicial caution at each stage: In the first round of cases 
(Rasul & Ors), the Supreme Court found in favour of the applicants, but based on a statutory 
rather than constitutional right to habeas. Congress changed the statute, clearly removing the 
right. In the  second round of cases, (Hamdan & ors) the Court decided narrowly that the new 
statute did not apply to pending applications. So a third round was necessary (Boumidiene and 
ors). Mr B was no stranger to the vicissitudes of HR litigation. Years earlier, he had a 
champagne-warranting victory when a Bosnian court held there was no evidence to support 
his transfer to the US, and ordered his release. He was abducted as he left by the US and 
bundled off to Gitmo regardless. And so his case gave rise to the historic Boumidiene 
judgment where the US SC finally found constitutional right to habeas corpus.  
Jubilation at the 2008 judgment was further tempered by the fact that despite the victory of 
principle and habeas proceedings exposing the lack of basis for detention in the first few years 
after Boumidiene, in practice the system has ground to a halt since. Courts have found that 
while they have power to review the lawfulness of detention, they have no power to order 
release. Moreover, standards of review have been alt red to the point where, as a dissenting 
US judge noted “it is difficult to see what is left of Boumidiene’s requirement of meaningful 
review.” 
A historic victory or an epic failure? 
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On one view, as Jules Lobel has stated, it was a pyrrhic victory, that risks legitimizing a 
profoundly unjust system by creating an illusion of judicial review that does not exist. While 
many were released, he notes this was due to other action. 
While these are compelling points, there are other dimensions of impact we should not 
neglect. The expressive value of this judgment for one, in shattering the underlying 
assumptions that anyone can be held in legal limbo. In addition, perhaps the key contribution 
of the GB litigation did not arise in 2008, but earlier, when the US was forced to provide 
detainees with access to lawyers in order to prepare for litigation. In so doing, the world was 
in turn given access to information about the detain es - who these people, described 
generically as “the worst of the worst,” really were, and the terrible torture many had endured.  
And things began to change (not enough, but significantly). For example, allegations against 
our client - that he was the ‘no 3 al Qaeda’ - were dropped and he was no longer alleged to 
have been a member of AQ at all. Many cases of mistaken identities, and entirely empty files, 
emerged. 
The litigation may not have led directly to release, or even to meaningful judicial review for 
many. But it triggered access, exposed facts and lack of justifications, maintained 
international attention despite Guantanamo fatigue, and influenced the terms and the tenor of 
the conversation, increasing the pressure on foreign governments to intervene, on 
international organisations to condemn, and on the US to reduce detainees (which are down 
from 779 to 41).  
Part 4. Context and the Road Ahead 
Which brings us back to our lenses. We have seen with our first sensitive lens the 
multidimensional, often concealed, levels of impact.  With the 2nd long lens we saw how 
impact arose at multiple stages, before during and lo g after litigation. With the third lens we 
must also take a wide-angled look at litigation in context. This is a crucial aspect of strategic 
litigation.  
The impact, potential and dangers of litigation can only be assessed in the context of the 
particular individual, local, national and international context in relation to the particular 
issues at the particular time.  
Moreover, the wide-angled lens shows how litigation f rms part of and intersects with other 
action for change. Change happens gradually and cumulatively, often not from an isolated 
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case but from a series of cases, in conjunction with other processes. Whether litigation meets 
its potential to influence legal, social, cultural change for example, may depend  less on what 
courts say and do, or what people say and do in court, than on the work of a much broader 
range of actors – civil society, media, legislatures. Years of civil society engagement often 
precedes, and lays the groundwork, for litigation. In turn, it is only through the follow-up of 
multiple actors that what happens in the dark room of the court can be projected back out, 
seen, heard and felt, in the real world.  
I will end with few conclusions and observations as regards the road ahead.  
SHRL will be a growth industry in years ahead, which presents opportunities, and tensions 
and challenges, of relevance to us as an  academic community, across disciplines, in 
partnership with litigators and civil society.  I look forward to working with many of you on 
these in the years ahead. 
There is a need to enhance understanding of the impact – positive and negative - that  HR 
litigation has had in particular contexts, and why, to inform strategies for the future. We 
should enrich the conversation on evaluating impact in context, grappling with 
methodological quagmires, while being mindful that many forms of impact elude 
“measurement” as such. Tensions, and ethical and professional issues, need to be addressed 
when multiple ‘strategic’ goals conflict with those of clients, as they sometimes do. In the 
way we use litigation, as a tool among others for change, we need to respect and safeguard its 
particular role in the protection of the rule of law.  
There is scope for more fruitful partnerships betwen academia and practice in litigation 
proceedings themselves; in building the capacity of judges and lawyers; and of course, 
importantly, in preparing the next generation of responsible, strategic lawyers. 
To conclude, SHRL has enormous potential. But it is not a neutral enterprise, and it is crucial 
to avoid lenses - rose coloured ones this time - that may distort reality. Around the globe  
today, HR litigation brings devastating consequences victims, lawyers and NGOs. Bad cases 
happen, and bad cases sometimes do make bad law. Backlash against groups and causes, from 
case brought in the wrong place at wrong time, can set human rights progress back years.  
Litigation may only rarely provide solutions for human rights problems. But it can and does 
make a difference, sometimes directly and dramatically, at other times in ways not 
anticipated, often subtly and even imperceptibly changing the human rights landscape. 
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Perhaps, then, what we look through is not a camera but a Kaleidoscope, with litigation 
turning and changing context just a little. 
So, reflecting on the value of SHRL, do we get our champagne I hear you ask (a reasonable 
question at this time of the afternoon)?  
If we are to understand litigation as part of lengthy processes of change, the champagne may 
have to stay in the fridge for a very long time. Alternatively, we may find smaller champagne 
moments (excuses for thimbles full?) – when the tenor of conversations shift; when a lawyer 
takes an unpopular case or a judge decides it, without fear or favour, and despite risks; when a 
government is forced to give account; when a chapel to honour thousands dead is erected; 
when a victim speaks up; when a man sitting in GB knows that the prospect of justice, while 
remote, is not abandoned;  when a former slave finds the strength to testify, and then looks 
you in the eye.    
I think we can toast to that. 
 
